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THE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
AND PRACTICAL EDUCATION
Carl McGowan*
It is always a distinct pleasure for me to be a visitor
at this law school, with whose faculty and alumni I
have had so many ties over the years. But I regard it
as a very special privilege to be here this time as an incumbent of the Schwartz Fellowship. It was my good
fortune to become acquainted with Judge Schwartz
during my lawyering days in Chicago, and to
appear before him in his court. To know of his deep
and wide-ranging interest in all that related to the
life of the mind, and of his public and private activities as a lawyer and citizen, was to grasp the
meaning of a truly humanist culture. He was a man
of Repaissance dimensions, of which his career as a
great judge was only one element. Our memories of
him invariably evoke the delight we took in his presence among us, and continuously shape our own
aspirations.
I conceive of this occasion as belonging wholly to
the first-year class - to the neophytes, that is to say,
and not to those among us who have already been
through the initiation; I hope to keep what I have to
say focused upon the former. The present moment is
one of some anxiety to me as well as to my audience.
The source of that in your case is presumably your
preoccupation with the question of sheer survival
during the days and weeks ahead, as you confront the
rigors of a new intellectual discipline which you have
always assumed to be rational, but which your mentors - who, after all, should know - appear deter-

mined to demonstrate is not the case at all. My own
apprehensiveness derives rather from a concern as to
whether I can say anything that will be helpful in
your living from day to day with this paradox.
The first - and best - reassurance is that every

beginning law student has, and continues to hav e for
some time, the uneasy feelings that are now yours, or
shortly will be. The very first class I attended at Col*United States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit.
This paper was delivered to the entering student of the University of
Chicage Law School on October 5, 1978.
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umbia Law School several eons ago ended after fifteen minutes when the first student called upon to
recite, after being covered with confusion, slumped to
the floor in a dead faint. The rest of us made our way
out of the classroom in a bemused state, our minds
intent on calculating the mathematical probabilities
of whether, it being a very large class and the professor's method being known to involve only one or two
recitations per class, we might get through the
semester without being called upon at all.
As we assembled for the second meeting of the
class two days later, our feelings were very much the
same as those of "uncoordinated Little leaguers
standing in various right fields praying that the ball
will not be hit to them."' As the professor casually
selected a name card from the large pack in front of
him, the tension was great. As he called out the
name, "Mr. Smith," one of our number stood up
promptly and said "Mr. Joseph Smith?" The professor, who undoubtedly did not know there were two
Smiths in the class and who could not have cared less
as to which head was to be laid on the block next,
said "Why, yes." To which the student responded "I
am Mr. John Smith," and triumphantly sat down,
leaving the slower-witted Smith to his fate.
Now, this had, on balance, a curiously heartening
effect on the rest of us. Although it suggested
ominously that, in terms of intra-class competition,
we were on a pretty fast track, certainly as compared
with our undergraduate years, it did indicate that, in
the student-faculty struggle, there were available to
each of us stores of human resourcefulness and ingenuity if we would only cultivate them - using our
heads, if you please, instead of wringing our hands. A
mind that could plan and function under pressure, as
did that of Mr. John Smith, might well, we thought,
be capable, if more constructively applied, of grasp.
ing the substantive aspects of the subject matter at
least well enough to resist obliteration in any
Socratic exchange, no matter how vigorously it might
be pressed. Indeed, this demonstration of the miracles to be wrought by the human mind when ear.
nestly employed dared us to dream that, later
perhaps rather than sooner but surely at some point,
"The New Yorker, August 7, 1978, at 17.
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we would be able to divine the method behind the
seeming madness.
It should also be reassuring for you to know that
more legally seasoned minds than yours have had
difficulties with the case method of teaching, to
which you will be so heavily exposed during your first
year. Only two years after Dean Langdell first introduced that method at the Harvard Law School in
1870, the opposition to it within the faculty, among
the alumni, and at the bar resulted in the creation of
a new law school at Boston University for the express
purpose of providing what was termed "an antidote
to the theoretical tendencies" alarmingly displayed
at Harvard. And in 1890 when Professor Keener was
brought down from Harvard to introduce the case
method at Columbia, the entire existing faculty with.
drew in protest a year later, and dissident alumni es.
tablished the New York Law School to enable them
to carry on their teaching in the old manner 2
I need not perhaps point out that both Harvard
and Columbia survived the counter-reformation; and
the new schools themselves embraced the case
method within a relatively short time. A relevant recent statistic in this connection, I believe, is a poll of
Harvard students as to their satisfaction with the
quality of teaching at the law school. Of those nearing the end of their first year, 74% professed satisfac.
tion, but the figure dropped to 41% for second-year
students, and to 20% for third-year.3 Since Harvard,
like most other schools, employs the case method
most heavily in the first year and sharply phases it
down thereafter, the merits of that method may
become more visible to first-year stuoents as the year
goes on than is true in the early weeks.
I suspect that the same may be true of many of you
who find the case method frustrating and bewildering in your early exposure to it. In any event, as one
of my own teachers at Columbia wrote as long ago as
1951, "In practice the case method has never stood
still"4 , and the law schools generally have moved to
'Here, and elsewhere, I am indebted to Erwin Griswold's informa.
tive and thoughtful article, Lgal Education: 1878-1978,64 A.B.A. J.
1051, 105&56 (1978).
Harvard Law Record, April 28, 1978, at 3,
'Patterson, 1Me Case Method in American Legal Education: Its
Origins and Objectives, 4 J. Igal Ed. 1(1951).
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what seems to be a sensible balance between the case
method and other ways of giving instruction in the
law. After the first year, you are going to se a great
deal of the latter, but it will rest on a strong and solid
foundation provided by the case system. Your later
life in the law will constantly be characterized by the
necessity of analyzing and differentiating judicial
decisions, and of formulating verbal responses Ader
pressure, whether you are standing 6n your feet in a
courtroom or sitting down at a negotiating conference. The classroom regimen of the months im.
mediately before you will stand you in very good
stead indeed in the post-academic years ahead.
What is, and should continue to be, a support to
your confidence is the fact that you are here at all.
The ratio of applications to admisons Is strikingly
high at this law school, and your selection from
among so many is in itself a confident prediction by
experts that you will be able to cope. Your choice
among institutions is a wise one in the sense that
your affiliation is with one of those schools that have
firmly anchored themselves in a university framework, with all that that implies in terms of the purity
and elevation of educational objectives, and their
enrichment by ready access to other intellectual disciplines. When President William Rainey Harper of
the newly-created University of Chicago quickly
turned his attention at the turn of the century to the
founding of a law school, he asserted that "Great
emphasis will be placed upon the fact that the
University spirit is to prevail in the work of the Law
School .. ." 5.That emphasis has persisted from that
day to this, and constitutes your guarantee that you
have not enrolled in a mere trade school.
Periodically throughout the history of legal education in this country, the University spirit is affected,
not to say imperilled, by an upsurge of demands for a
greater measure of what is variously termed more
"useful" or more "practical" instruction. We appear
to be in such a cycle at the moment. The Chief Justice
of the United States - to whom all of us are greatly
indebted for the extraordinary effort he has made,
despite his own heavy judicial burdens, to improve
the administration of justice - testifying in London
IF. L.Ellsworth, Law and the Midway (1977), at 84.
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before a Royal Commission inquiring into the state of
the legal profession in Great Britain, ventured the
assertion that 50% of the American trial bar are in.
competent. In his speech to the American Law In.
stitute in May he urged that at leant some of the law
schools experiment with devoting the third year
solely to practical training. In his latest appearance
before the American Bar Association in August he
stressed the result of a poll recently conducted by the
Law School Admission Council. Of the 1600 law
school graduates of six schools between 1955 and
1970 who responded to the inquiry, a significant percentage professed dissatisfaction with their legal
education because they had not been prepared to do
such things as investigate and deal with facts, draft
legal documents, counsel with clients, and negotiate
settlements. He concluded from this that somo form
of internship is essential after which certification of
competence must be obtained to qualify for trial ad.
vocacy.
A commission constituted by the Judicial Con.
ference of the United States to consider the
desirability of propounding standards for admission
to practice before the federal courts has recently
recommended that a national bar examination be instituted as a prerequisite to such admission. That ex.
amination will cover specified subjects related to
federal practice; and, in addition to success in that
examination, the applicant must show that he or she
has had four trial "experiences" involving some com.
bination of actual participation in state or federal
trials, simulated trials in law schools, attendance at
continuing legal education programs, or supervised
observation of federal court trials.
It is evident, of course, that a project of this nature
cannot, any more than could the so-called Clare
Committee which was given a similar mission by
Chief Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, logically avoid the specification of the
courses which must be taken in law school. And if the
federal courts move in this direction, the state courts
will inevitably follow, raising the spectre of the determination of the curricula of the law schools by a
widely-varying group of judges whose legal horizons
are inevitably bounded by their immediate concerns
5

with what is going on in their courts.
At the Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit not
long ago, we gave the members a chance to react to
the Clare Committee proposal by scheduling a debate
between Mr. Clare and Dean Sovern of the Columbia
Law School. When the Dean had finished his
devastating dissection of the Committee's report and
the floor was opened for discussion, not a single voice
was raised, and we moved on to the next item on the
agenda satisfied that neither the bench nor the bar in
our circuit saw any need to pursue this approach.
Parenthetically, I see that, in one of his first official communications to his constituency, the new
president of the American Bar Association has said
that, in the laudable interest of cutting costs so as to
reduce fees to clients, he was initiating "a new effort
to encourage the teaching of law office management
skills in law schools." Surely attendance at one law
faculty meeting, followed by a visit to a few law professors' offices, should be enough to demonstrate that
this is a hollow dream at best.
Although I do spend a lot of time reading trial
transcripts, as an appellate judge I am obviously not
situated as well as a trial judge to form impressions
about the degree of incompetence of the trial bar. I
did note, however, that a questionnaire sent by the
Federal Judicial Center to the Federal judges
showed less than a majority of the district judges as
believing there is a serious problem. And Dean
Griswold has, in the article I referred to earlier, sug.
gested that those judges who are complaining may, in
view of the steadily heightening bar admission requirements of the last 50 years, "be unaware of the
improvement in the average quality of the practitioners before them, and the inadequate ones may
stand out more clearly."7
Although obviously one incompetent trial lawyer is
too many, in this field, as in others, we confront the
necessity of having to define our priorities. I find it
hard to believe that the professional competence of
its bar is even remotely close to the top of the scale of
the present priorities of the federal judicial system,
and I should be loath to have anything but the most
*Tate, President's Page, 64 A.B.A. J. 1313 (1978).
?Griswold, supra note 2, at 1061.
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demonstrable and urgent need result in action which
would impair the capacity of university faculties to
determine the objectives and content of university
education, in law as elsewhere.
Talk about the necessity of an internship for trial
practice comparable to that required ,f medical
school graduates seems to me to overlook the fact
that we do not lack internshipe for law school graduates who want to be litigators. The United States Attorneys, the Department of Justice, the public defender agencies, the state, county, and municipal law
offices, the civil legal aid societies - all and more
have been a training ground for a long time comparable to the hospitals in the medical field. It is not as if
there were simply no opportunities for learning by
doing in litigation except as the law schools provide
them.
The young law school graduate with a good
academic record can ordinarily get actual litigation
training in public agencies of the kind I have mentioned - and they have done it and are doing it in
large numbers. Many of the country's most competent trial lawyers have followed that path to their
present eminence, and it is a training which no law
school of distinction either can or should try to equal.
That eminence rests upon two essential bases one is the training which a good law school gives all
its students in basic legal concepts, close and searching analysis, and the imaginative formulation of
legal theory to serve the client's interest; the other is
experience in actual litigation derived from having
been in trial often enough to feel at ease in a
courtroom and to be alert to the tactical problems
which invariably arise. No trial lawyer can be really
competent if he does iot have both. We should be
wary of diverting the law schools from their highly
satisfactory performance of the one when superior instruction in the other is as readily available as it now
as.
My objection is not necessarily to a required internship as such before a lawyer can start representing private clients in the trial courts. It is rather that
the university law schools should not be called upon
to provide it at the expense of the more fundamental
and essential legal training which only they can 7

and do - give.

I confeek to' considerable wonderment about law
school graduates- atleastof a universitylaw school
- who would register dissatisfaction because they
had not been trained in the negotiation of settlements or how to deal with thei ,clients. They sound
to me very much like people with no personal aptitude for law practice who are blamng it on their
law schools. The nature and content of the education
provided at a university law school should not be
transformed for the hopeless task of making them
different people from what they are.
The university law school, like any other Institution, does not exist In a social vacuum, nor is it an
ivory tower. A distinguished law school dean in this
state has recently observed that the uniqueness of
such a school derives from the fact that "it faces in
two directions: inward toward the university, with
its interest in the intellectual life and its concern for
the transmission and development of knowledge
through research and teaching, and outward toward
the law in action as opposed to the law in books."
There are, as he wisely notes, tensions that inherently flow from this condition.
No university law school of which I am aware,
notably including this one, has been oblivious of
these tensions or failed to move towards their accommodation by clinical programs and other methods of
expanding the law school experience beyond the
walls of the classroom. Virtually all of the law clerkship applications I receive from university law school
students reveal summer employment by law firms or
public agencies. The essential thing is that a rational
balance between the inward and outward facings of
the university law school be not disturbed by the
forced intrusion of purely professional interests from
without.
It is by such a standard that all of us with a stake
in maintaining legal education in the United States
at its present and longstanding extraordinary level of
excellence should measure the current discontents.
And no one has a bigger stake in that regard than you
here this evening who are at the very threshold of
Cribbmtt Report to the Chanselltr fbr 1977.78 College of Law,
University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, p. 2.
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your full-time and formalperiod of legal education. I
hope most earnestly that you will not let the siren
song of practicality lure you towards the rocks of
knowing where to file a lawsuit but unable to con.
ceive a sound theory upon which to base it. You can
learn the first within an hou after you are-in your
own or somebody else's law office; if you cannot do
the second by the time you leave this school,,you will
in all likelihood never be able to. In speaking of legal
education, it is not unacceptably paradoxical "to
adhere," as Walter Gellhorn has put it, "to the belief
that the theoretical is indeed the practical - and is,
in any case, the justification for a university pro.
gram."'
It is also important for you to know that the current clamor from your elders about professional in.
competence does not speak with a single voice. There
are many lawyers and judges who stand apart from
it, and who, in particular, do not accept any assump.
tion that such problems as may exist can and should
be solved by departures in legal education which, far
from being new, threaten a return to the 19th century
when legal education was imprisoned in practicality
and awaiting liberation by the universities.
A most distinguished federal trial court judge in
New York City, Marvin Frankel, has vigorously exposed the weaknesses of the solutions being urged
and the danger they pose to our university legal
education. Judge Frankel has written:
The paths to professional excellence are and
must be multifarious. The effective lawyer or
judge, as we must all know, is compounded of
concern, wisdom, energy, and judgment, not
prescribed hours of training or other mechanical accomplishments. The several proposals
now being pressed for narrow and compelled
conformities are largely beside the point. Not
that lawyers and judges don't need all the
education they can get. We do, and we tend in
numbers to demonstrate an awareness of the
need. What is not shown to be needed is some
particular species of universal gimmicks for the
promotion of competence. And it is not unfair, I
*Gellhorn, PreachireThat Old Time Religion, 63 Va. L Rev 175,
177 (1977).
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submit, to label as, gimmicks the narrow,
gauged, partial, inflexible prescription of
courses or attendance hours as conditions of
admission or good standing.10

Erwln Griswold, now flourishing in private practice after hie long and distinguished academic career
at the Harvard Law SIhool, has emphasized that one
of the greatvirtues of university law school education
has been the flexibility and>mobility it has gven its
graduates to move into all sectors of the law and the
other areas of endeavor in which it is put to work.
"All experience," says Dean Griswold, "shows that
law students have little conception of what they will
be doing five years, ten years, thirty years in the
future.... The homogenization of the law

echools... gives all students and lawyers a more
nearly equal opportunity, not only at the beginning,
but at later stages, as opportunities, often unex.
pected, may develop."'
Finally, Professor Francis Allen, in a thoughtful
essay written ir. 176 when he was president of the
Association of American Law Schools, has warned of
anti-intellectual elements in the current impatience
with the alleged insufficiencies of practical content in
the law school curricula. Shrewdly observing that the
pressures for more so-called useful instruction come
not alone from judges and lawyers outside the law
schools but from within as well in the persons of students who wish to be upon graduation instantly effec.
tive in the pursuit of social or personal objectives
peculiar to themselves, Professor Allen concludes
that the "preservation and extension of an intellectually-based and humanistically-motivated legal
education is the greatest challenge facing American
law schools.""s
Stating the challenge in that way does not imply
that it isto be met by unyielding academic resistance
to clinical programs and other means of projecting
the student's vision and experience beyond the
classroom. In my court at the present time at least
IoFrmnkel, CurirLeauyer'Inwmpetene:PrinumNon Nocere, 10
Creighton L Rev. 613, 634 (1977).
"Griswold, suprao note 2, at 1062.
sAlln, The New Ani.Intellectualism in Aseicom Lgal Educa.
tion. 28 Mercer L Rev. 447, 461 (1971).
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60% or more of the indigent criminal appeals are
briefed and argued by law students under faculty
supervision. This beliefits the bar,.the court, the stu.
dents, and, not least, the client. who are receiving
devoted and effective representation; it certainly
adds a meaningful dimension to law school educa.
tion.
The question remains one, however, of a proper
balance between the traditional university law
school teaching which has served us so well and remains critically essential, on the one hand, and out.
ward-looking recognition of what is happening in the
legal world beyond the academic groves, on the other.
Much of that latter burden in virtually all areas of
law, including the highly specialized fields, is presently being carried by the phenomenal growth industry of continuing legal education after admission to
practice, to which many law schools are making a
contribution, along with bar associations and private
enterprises. With the multiplication of educational
resources ofthis kind, relief is afforded from the pressures on the law schools to divert their energies from
the essential teaching and research functions which
only they can provide in a climate which is neither
that of the marketplace nor the political forum.
The idea of a university, to use Cardinal Newman's
phrase, has very vital implications for the study of
law, as of anything else. It has nothing to do with
tricks of the trade which may effectively confuse an
opposition witness who is doing his best to tell the
truth, or hang a jury. Those of you who come to un.
derstand this fact as you grope your way through the
confusions ahead will have taken a first and essential
step towards being a truly competent lawyer in
whatever legal setting you may one day, probably to
your own great surprise, find yourself. I do not ask
that you be wholly passive and unquestioning about
the form of the legal education you will be receiving
here. I do suggest that most of the questions currently
being raised about legal education are not grounded
in any demonstrable crisis, and are relevant only to
what are now, and should remain, the fringe areas of
any legal education that is true to the university
spirit.
I turn now to the questions which it seems to me
you should be asking as you examine during the next
11

three years the product of the legal system as it is
presently functioning. As some of your elders at the
bar are professing concern at the way you will be
spending your time here in school, it surely is not
amiss for you to scrutinize carefully what they are up
to. Since they seem mainly concerned at the moment
as to whether you will be adequately equipped to win
each case you take to court for a client, perhaps a
good place to begin is with the workings of the adversary system itself.
Judge Frankel, after more than twelve years of
presiding over adversary trials, is voluntarily leaving
the bench with many questions in his mind on this
score. His last big case was a prolonged anti-trust
suit which ended in some disarray with one of the
senior lawyer participants pleading guilty to a crimi.
nal contempt charge for having made a false statement under oath to the judge in order to promote
what he conceived to be a tactical advantage of his
client. This incident brought to a head a growing feeling that the adversary trial, constituting a game played for high stakes, is putting intolerable pressures on
lawyers to play that game in any way calculated to

win the prize.
Apart from such a dramatic incident as this one,
many thoughtful lawyers and judges are beginning to
wonder if there are not to be found, in at least some
areas of human affairs, better, and certainly more expeditious and less costly, methods of dispute resolution. The American Bar Association has mounted a
major inquiry to this end. Judge Learned Hand long
ago observed, after many years of experience as both
a trial and an appellate judge, that he could conceive
of no greater disaster happening to him as an individual than to become involved in a law suit. And
there is quite evident at the moment a rising popular
concern, on the part of large corporations as well as
less powerful members of the public, with the functioning of our system of justice in its adversary trial
aspects. That alone, in my submission, is a reason
why the present insistence that the law schools give
more practical instruction in how to try - and win -

law suite is untimely at best.
The private adversary contest tried before judge or
jury is not, of course, the only contributor to the rising torrent of litigation flooding the courts. In the
12

court on whih Ist,81% of allthe casesled in the
last statistical year consisted of civillgation involv.
ing the federal government; and the major part of
those cases came on direct review from federal agencies without the intervention of the federal trial
court. Indeed, many of them involved essentially
policy decisions of general and prospective applica.
tion made by the agency, under delegated authority
from Congress, in proceedings which are essentially
legislative in nature.
Although our court, both by congressional design
and by virtue of its location, carries the heaviest
burden of this kind of litigation, all of the other cir.
cuits are in the business as well; and you will be exposed to many such cases in the next three years.
They tend to be cases of great complexity and
difficulty, involving, as they frequently do, highly
specialized and technical areas of knowledge. But the
difficulties, for me at least, have increasingly become
aggravated by nagging doubts as to whether some of
the regulatory schemes are necessary at all, and, even
if they are, what the role of the courts should be, if
any, in sitting in judgment upon the results. The
whole of the legal process adds up to a tremendous
deployment of time and resources which arguably
could be either dispensed with altogether or put to
better use. This kind of administrative litigation has
become a major preoccupation of the practising bar;
and, again, the overall costs are enormous.
The fact seems to be that we, as a people, have a
considerable talent for devising regulatory machin.
ery to deal with new and significant developments in
trade and commerce. At the same time, we appear to
have no capacity whatever to dismantle or redesign
that machinery when the passage of time either
eliminates the problem or alters its character. A
classic example of this is the field of transportation
where all the signs for some years now have pointed
towards the need for a massive injection of competition. The railroads, which long ago lost their
monopoly dominance, continue to be closely regulated. The motor carrier industry, not having
monopoly characteristics to begin with, has been
given them by a regulatory scheme which is as unnecessary today as it was when it was first imposed
forty years ago.
13

The only bright spot at the moment is air transportation, and that is due to the apointment not much
more than a year ago of one of those theoretical and
impractical university professors as chairman of the
Civil Aeronautics Board. By persuadibg the Board to
move in the direction of allowing greater freedom to
the carriers to engage in rate competition and to undertake new routes, he appears to have demonstrated
to Congress that deregulation is desirable, and legis.
lation of significant proportions to that end is on the
very verge of becoming law. Larger numbers of pas.
uengers have been travelling at lower fares, and carrier earnings are up, causing the industry in the main
to face forward with enthusiasm towards the rolling
back of the regulatory shelter.
From the judicial standpoint, the happy prospect
looms that the courts may be spared the complicated
route cases, for example, in which the Board, not
being able to decide them by flipping a coin as be.
tween the equally qualified applicants, has had to
devise other rationales for justifying the choice of one
over another. Also cast into limbo will be rate cases
which involve carrier-proposed reductions - not increases - and where the challenges come not from
the consuming public but from the competitors.
There is also the passion which the law seems to
breed in initially unsuccessful litigants for an endless
series of higher levels at which their causes can be
pressed, and the readiness of legislators to gratify it.
Not long ago there was a case in our court involving
recently enacted coal mining legislation where the
ultimate question was whether, in the language of
regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior
pursuant to statutory authority, the bathhouse was
conveniently located to the mine head. Now I am
sure that if I were either a coal miner or a mine
owner adversely affected by a field inspector's ruling
on this score, this would be an issue of consequence
that I would like to be able to take to some impartial
and expert authority for a further look.
What Congress had in fact provided in this regard
was a full evidentiary hearing and adjudication by an
administrative law judge in the Interior Department;
full appellate review within the Department, including consideration by the Secretary or a board designated by him; a review of that determination by a cir14

cuit court of appeals; and, finally, the opportunity to
seek further review in the United States Supreme
Court. This strikes me as resort to legal processes run
riot. I cannot believe that the Republic would fall or
the foundations of our liberties be demolished if an
issue of this kind is resolved once and for all at a
much earlier stage, and arguably without the aid of
the courts at all.
It is for anomalies of this kind, in what you are
continually being told is that intensely practical
world outside the university, that I hope you will be
on the look-out as you read your cases. That busy
world tends to accept things as they are, but it is the
business of university people to say that the Emperor
has no clothes on if he hasn't. The law and its pro.
cesses have been put to geometrically increasing uses
in this century, and legislation and litigation have
come to be relied upon very heavily for the accommodation of a vast array of political and social problems, some of which may not lend themselves comfor.
tably to such modes of resolution. A first look at the
system by fledgling law students may conceivably be
a clearer and more penetrating look than that of
those who have been living within it for a long time.
Three years lie ahead for you in this lively, restless,
probing, speculative, and skeptical world of the intellect that is a university. They will afford you an
unparalleled opportunity to look at - and beyond -

the system of law as it is now operating. If you are
alert, and responsive to the university spirit, you will
undoubtedly see some areas where there is too much
law, and some where there is not enough. The practical world, in my view of it, needs those perceptions
far more than it does your intensive training here in
law office management or settlement strategy.
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Practice"
Stanley A.Kaplan, January 10, 1978.
No. 5. "Six Man Juries, Majority Verdicts What Difference Do They Make?"
Hans Zeisel, March 15, 1973.
No. & "On Emergency Powers of the President:
Every Inch a King?"
Gerhard Casper, May 31,1973.
No. 7. "The Anatomy of Justice in Tazation"
Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr.,
October 1,1973.
No. & "An Approach to Law"
Edward H. Levi, October 15,1974.
No. 9. "The New Consumerism and the
Law School"
Walter J. Blum, February 15, 1975.
No. 10. "Congress and the Courts"
Carl McGowan, April 17,1975.
No. 11. "The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation in 1976"
Walter J. Blum, November 19,1976.
No. 12. "Making the Punishment Fit the
Crime: A Consumers' Guide to
Sentencing Reform"
Franklin E. Zimring, January 24, 1977.
No. 13. "Talk to Entering Students"
James B. White, August 15, 1977.
No. 14. "The Death Penalty and

the Insanity Defense"
Hans Zeisel, April 15, 1978.

No. 15. "Group Defamation"
Geoffrey R Stone, August 10, 1978.
No. 16. "The University Law School
and Practical Education"

Carl McGowan, December 20, 1978.

